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Ethics of Knowledge Sharing: 
A Perspective of Social Ontology 





I. Knowledge as Ability: An Appraisal of Personal Ontology  
In a societal framework knowledge is regarded as a complex phenomenon 
refers to opinion, data, information, idea, understanding, skill, mystic insight, 
wisdom, etc. The complexity is part of theorization of knowledge, which lies in 
the properties of experience, reason, emotion, and intuition, etc. Knowledge 
can be experiential, rational and intuitive. Experiential and rational knowledge 
is believed and justified, whereas the intuitive knowledge is mostly taken as 
certain and infallible. Nevertheless, both experiential and intuitive knowledge 
are based on consciousness. The knower as conscious being has the ability to 
acquire, articulate and actualize the content of knowledge (Hyman 1999, 436-
439). 
The power of is actualizing is grounded in the intentionality of 
consciousness.  Intentionality forms the structure of knowledge by relating the 
knower with the object of knowledge. In other words, in the form of intentional 
representation the content of experience is known and further articulated for 
communication. The act of representation and the act of communication are 
two functional aspects of human intentionality (Searle 1983). Knowledge 
sharing involves communication in which the content of knowledge is 
transferred to the learner. In this context, it is presumed that the learner would 
be minimally able to comprehend the content which is being communicated. 
Thus, knowledge sharing presupposes apart from biological and psychological 
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abilities, a cultural background in which we exchange ideas, share information, 
etc. (Searle 1983, 144-159) The cultural background acts as a normative 
condition for regulating the act of sharing. Without this normative pre 
condition of sharing knowledge would lose its integrity. Let’s illustrate it with 
an example from the Mahabharata, one of the great Indian epics.  
In the Mahabharata, when Dronāchārya, the teacher of Pāndavas and 
Kauravas, intends to test the archery ability of all his disciples, he takes all of 
them near a tree and instructs that there is a bird sitting in one of the branches 
of the tree. He then asks all his disciples to fix the target for shooting the bird. 
Following the teacher’s instruction they made efforts in targeting the bird. In 
the meanwhile, Dronāchārya keeps asking the disciples one by one, whether 
they are able to set their respective targets. Responding to Dronāchārya, one of 
them says he is not able to see the bird but he can shoot the bird by shooting 
the branches of the tree. Another disciple replies saying that he is able to see 
the leaves only. Someone else replies that he is able to target the bird. But when 
it is asked to Arjun, he replies saying that ‘he is able to target the bird’s eye.’ 
Arjun’s reply is considered to be the best amongst all the replies, for 
Dronāchārya. It is not because Dronāchārya was hoping for such specific 
answer, but he knew that targeting the eye of the bird is better for shooting the 
bird. Before shooting it is advantageous to know the attention of the bird and 
that becomes clear by observing the eyes of the bird. Though Dronāchārya’s all 
these disciples had the ability to shoot the bird by shooting the branches, leaves 
and the tree, still it was important for Dronāchārya to know their respective 
abilities; precisely the modes of actualizing the knowledge. As the contents of 
actualization of these disciples differ their corresponding abilities also differ. 
This signifies that the ability is something unique and personal. Hence, it is 
important to discuss whether knowledge as personal ability can be shared at 
all.  
Traditionally, it is believed that all the material possessions and 
properties can be shared physically and legally. Knowledge as intellectual 
property is exclusively in the possession of the knower which cannot be 
physically divided and shared.  This personification of knowledge is illustrated 
by Vishnu Sharma:  
Jñātibhi bantyatĕ naiba, chorenāpi naniyate, Dānena naksyamjāti, Vidyā ratanam 
mahādhanam (Acharya 1952, 28). 
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This sloka signifies knowledge that results of vidyā (education/ learning) is the 
most valuable wealth, is physically non-sharable amongst the kith and kin. 
And the feature of immateriality of knowledge suggests that it cannot be stolen 
by others. Moreover, it entails that knowledge per se is one of the valuable 
resources if offered to educate someone then there is no loss of knowledge. 
Rather knower is enriched in such mode of communication (Schmitz 1994, 768).  
The notion of exclusive ownership of knowledge entails personal 
ontology. Knowledge is person centric, in the sense that the content of 
knowledge is articulated by the knower. And the knower knows how to 
actualize his ability. The ability and mode of actualization conforms the 
knower’s ability and authority to use knowledge. In this regard, the knower’s 
decision is a voluntary act. All voluntary actions are subject moral appraisal 
and therefore must be guided by norms; otherwise it may have negative 
impacts. For example, Dronāchārya’s disapproval of sabara Ekalavya’s interest 
of leaning warfare along with the Kauravas and Pāndavas is not morally 
justified. Being a sabara (a tribal person), he was not fulfilling the criteria of 
admission in his āshrama─ the place of learning and had no right to learn along 
with the princes. This shows the denial of right to knowledge (Sen 1987 & Audi 
2005). Right to know is person’s moral right exercised with self-interest. A 
person is free and must be self-motivated for expressing his will to learn. 
Dronāchārya’s rejection is an indication of voluntary act of knowledge sharing. 
The intention of sharing here denies ‘the intrinsic value attached to the 
existence or fulfillment of rights.’ (Sen 1987, 49-50). It lacks proper moral 
grounding as Dronāchārya shows his individualistic concern and selfish 
motive while demanding Ekalavya’s right-hand thumb for gurudakshinā – 
tradition of repaying the teacher after formal education. Dronāchārya’s 
acknowledgement and acceptance of gurudakshinā is not only an instance of 
violation of moral rights but also is a sign of dissolution of normativity in the 
field of knowledge sharing.  
To avoid such problems, we argue that the right to share the knowledge 
demands a normative usage with a good reason. Knowledge should be 
meaningfully articulated taking into consideration of systematic formation, 
examination, and practice. A non-normative framework might not help to 
prevent misutilization of knowledge. However, knowledge cannot just remain 
within the domain of the subject or the knower. Knowledge ought to be shared 
for the sake of its own development, so that if the need arises it can be recalled 
at any point in time. In this connection, knowledge development has pragmatic 
concern and the user of knowledge must examine the practical as well as 
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theoretical utility. The practical utility of knowledge is realized only when we 
apply knowledge to resolve certain practical difficulties. For instance, 
knowledge of technology helps in solving certain practical difficulties. On the 
other hand, the theoretical utility of knowledge refers to the internal growth 
and novelty of knowledge.  
II. Human Intentionality as an Ontological Ground of Knowledge  
Knowledge development is essential to human life. It shows the ways of 
surviving, adopting to new situations, competing with others, establishing 
harmony, etc. These features of knowledge building are rooted in the 
intentionality of the being. A biological being would have some intentionality 
through which it interacts with the world.  So far as the human intentionality is 
concerned it is intrinsic to the mind. The notion of intrinsic intentionality not 
only explains the intentional interaction with the world but also explicates the 
self-conscious activities. The self-consciousness unfolds the dual function of 
intentionality: firstly, humans act with a psychological mode that results in 
bringing condition of satisfaction, and secondly, it shows the direction of fit. 
(Searle 1983, 172) So far as the latter is concerned intentionality works in two 
ways; that is, relating the self with the world and the world with the self. It is 
precisely in this intentional mode of interaction, the human agency has shown 
the ability to comprehend, rationalize, evaluate, etc. The former, on the other 
hand, is the consequence of the latter. The satisfaction and happiness that an 
agent obtains shows the fulfillment of the psychological mode in which the act 
is being performed. Thus, the intentionality of the self illustrates its own modes 
of action as well as relates to the action of the other. 
 Human intentionality is not merely biological, but also has the mental 
and the social features. The functional mode of intentional activities, according 
to Searle, would show the relationship between the biological and the social 
vis-à-vis the mental. In other words, every intentional action performed by the 
individual is conditioned by the biological and the social background (Searle 
1983, 141-159) He explains this by drawing out attention to the notions of 
knowing how and knowing that. For instance, if the chair-person during a 
seminar says that “the paper is open for discussion,” the chairperson expects 
that discussion, deliberation, questioning and answering would proceed 
according to the academic convention. There is a presupposition of convention 
– academic culture in which these activities take place. And it is expected that 
the chairperson and others whoever participates in the seminar would know 
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about the normativity of the convention. The chairperson’s knowledge about 
conducting the proceeding explains the ground of knowing-how which lies in 
the social or cultural background of academic activities like dialogue, 
discussion, debate, criticism, etc. in the seminars and conferences. Knowing how 
illustrates the way the person has acquired the skill or expertise. Moreover, the 
very act of uttering statement, making a remark, using gesture, etc. is physical 
activities that refer to the biological background. Thus, knowledge acquisition, 
in Searle's theorization of intentionality can be explained with reference to the 
biological and the cultural backgrounds.  
 
However, the biological and the cultural backgrounds are connected by the 
intentionality. Illustrating the relationship between background and 
intentionality, Searle writes,  
[it] occurs in a coordinated flow of action and perception, and the Background is a 
condition of possibility of forms taken by the flow. The flow of intentionality tends 
to rise to the level of the Background ability it reaches all the way down to the 
bottom of ability (Searle 1992, 195).  
 
Thus, Searle treats intentionality as a persisting feature intrinsic to both 
conscious mental life or thought experiences and the background. It is because 
one always intends to act, or have desired to share his/ her ideas or thoughts, 
and in the process he gets satisfaction. Intentionality persists in the very 
process of realizing the conditions. 
 Moreover, as a connecting principle the intentionality relates to the 
conscious and the unconscious background capacities (Searle 1994 & Panda 
1997). Since intentionality persists in the function of thinking that helps in 
developing skill and stance. In other words, through practices different skill 
can be developed; depending on the intentionality of individual’s interest and 
ability. And this form of intentionality rises from the bottom of conscious 
experiences to reach at the background level. On the other hand, the same 
background or the developed skill helps in representing thoughts or 
implementing ideas. For instance, when a skier practices he follows all the 
rules and instructions of his coach. If the skier has intended to learn and win 
the race, then from one level of his learning he tries to reach out to a level of 
perfection. And while obtaining that skill he not only applies those rules but 
also invents new ways of doing it. The intention of articulating of certain 
techniques and applying them during the race is something significant. It 
shows that intentionality is present in both the cases, i.e., for developing the 
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skill as well as for applying it. Thus, intentionality is instrumental in 
knowledge creation.  
 Knowledge building is necessary for developing social and cultural life. 
Human beings do live a cultural life. The cultural aspect plays an important 
role in making human life significant. That is to say, many of the natural 
behaviours are being regulated and refined through the cultural activities and 
norms. The practice of cultural activities and follow up of norms in society do 
influence action. These actions are regulated by the norms for the realization of 
values. The cultural life is value laden. Searle writes, 
Humans are distinct from other animals in that they have a capacity to create not 
merely a social but an institutional reality. This institutional reality is, above all, a 
system of deontic powers. These deontic powers provide human agents with 
fundamental key for organized human society: the capacity to create and act on 
desired – independent reasons for action (Searle 2007, 125). 
 
Animals do exhibit natural behaviour which may be guided by desires and 
instincts or natural characteristics. Only humans try to control their natural 
instincts and regulate their actions in the direction where actions are justified 
by reasons, emotions, and virtues. Human actions are not just rational but also 
normative. The deontic power refers to the normative ability of judging the 
content of thoughts and action. This is something significant of the human 
beings engaged in knowledge creation. This ability pertains to all kinds of 
knowledge such as scientific, cultural, religious, moral, etc.  – It is the power to 
evaluate the very content of knowledge per se. The ability to exercise the power 
of judging the right and wrong; the will to perform certain duties; desire to 
show empathy, aspiration to know the truth, etc., unfold an important mode of 
the function of human intentionality at the social level.  
Furthermore, at the social level, intentionality works in two modes. 
They are, the constitutive intentionality and the regulative intentionality 
(Searle 1970, 30). Norms and institutions are based on constitutive 
intentionality, whereas the function of institutions is governed by the 
regulative intentionality. Nevertheless, these institutions also regulate our 
actions through imposing certain rules on us, which show the function of 
regulative intentionality. They are not two different kinds of intentionality; 
rather they exhibit two different modes of functions. Intentionality, therefore, 
not only constitutes the rules but also defines the rules.  
Thus, human civilization flourishes not only creating institutional facts 
but also creating norms and rules that regulate institutions and maintain 
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values. In this regard, the intentionality of knowledge creation is not therefore 
merely confined to survival but also to the values defining the meaningful 
existence of beings. Meaningful existence can be stated with regard to the 
development of personal well-being as well as the development of social well 
being. Unless one intends to relate to these two aspects of the being, i.e. the 
personal and the social, one may fail to find the novelty of life vis-à-vis the 
novelty of knowledge.  
III. The Economics of Knowledge Development 
Knowledge sharing as one of the essential means for development has larger 
significance. It includes the marker of personal and social well-being (Sen 1987, 
73) These two are often not considered to be related. A person can comprehend 
one’s well-being without taking into account the well-being of the other. They 
do represent two ontological pools. Nevertheless, they share an intentional 
relationship between them which is synchronic as well as diachronic. In a 
communicative framework they share a same normative ground, hence the 
relationship is synchronic. The individual or the self realizes its own being 
while participating with the other. And such participation is a part of an 
intentional field which is irreducible to any single individual’s subjective 
intentionality. On the other hand, the individual intentionality as primordial 
feature of conceiving the social, works in the mode of diachronic relationship 
with the other. However, we need not look at them as parallel events while 
contemplating on the notion of development, but they are to be intentionally 
linked to comprehend the collective vision by walking and working together 
(Toumela 1991) towards the realization of common social values by creating 
and restoring the public goods.   
The development of public goods requires resources. Creation and 
utilization of the resources are matter of economic and moral concerns. 
Economists have emphasized the optimal utilization of material resources and 
of late considered the significance of intellectual resources. Knowledge as an 
intellectual resource generates wealth creating opportunities of income and 
investment. It renews its content in the course of development indicating the 
renewal of intellectual resource. Hence, it is the driving force of the whole 
process of development. As Schumacher writes,  
 
All history – as well as current experience – points to the fact that it is man, not 
nature, who provides the primary resource: that the key factor of all economic 
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development come out of the mind of man. Suddenly there is an outburst of daring, 
initiative, invention, constructive activity, not in one field alone, but in many fields 
all at once. No-one may be able to say where it came from in the first place; but we 
can see how it maintains and even strengthens itself: through various kinds of 
schools, in other words, through education. In a very real sense, therefore, we can 
say that education is most vital for all resources (Schumacher 1993, 60).  
Education as an important means of knowledge creation requires not only the 
knowledge seeking individuals but also the proper environment for the 
cultivation knowledge. In this regard, there is a need to integrate the economic 
concern with the basic moral concern. The lack of moral concern for the public 
educational institutions in India as centers of learning has failed because of the 
degeneration of the normative standards. As a result, it has affected not only 
the academic productivity but also has failed to attract first-rate scholars to 
academics. Therefore, there is a basic need to develop educational institutions 
with a motive of renewing the academic culture.  
The degraded practice of academic culture will not only affect 
negatively the process of knowledge sharing but also demean the value of 
knowledge in society. Hence, ethics of knowledge sharing appeals to develop a 
common will for the protection of ethos of educational institutions. Such 
renewal will ignite hope of creating new ideas. Hence, it is necessary to 
inculcate academic values before renewing the educational system in India. 
The renewal must have a proper normative grounding to integrate the values 
of education with quality of life. If social development emphasizes to have 
quality life then it should be part of our thinking. And that would come 
through education which has the potency to transform the pattern and style of 
thinking and living. Education as the breeding ground of quality life must 
show the path of meaningful integration of knowledge with the life. Thus, 
there is a need for emphasizing rational and critical thinking as a form of life in 
order to strengthen the normative aspect of knowledge sharing vis-à-vis the 
normativity of social development.  
It is observed that knowledge is no more people centered; rather it is 
becoming technology centered. The use of technology is so much in the social 
spheres of life; it has endangered the personal aspect of reality. Knowledge in 
this sphere is detached from the subjectivity of the knower. This detachment is 
slightly delicate because articulation at various levels making knowledge 
passes through many channels before it is implemented. This shift of 
knowledge from the personal to the social shows the change in the ontology of 
knowledge. Knowledge as property in the market loses its personal 
belongingness and gains its social status. This as status marker opens up a new 
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horizon where knowledge acquires the property being sharable. Sharing 
necessitates normative condition: it demands much care and supervision in 
order to be kept in the custody of the other. And, the other is then empowered 
as trustee of knowledge. Thus, in the domain of the social the ownership of 
knowledge changes that shows the ways to social ontology.  
Moreover, knowledge economy is regulated by the market. In the 
market dominated society the process of introducing knowledge to the social 
world is technical and systematic. This process of knowledge creation is not 
only application oriented but also makes the content explicit.  Scientific 
thinking cultivated from the point of view of application is basically converted 
knowledge-content in the form of a market-product. The product operates in a 
proper regulative structure. Patents, copy rights and intellectual property 
rights are introduced for the normative regulation of knowledge in the market.  
The knowledge processed in a competitive market atmosphere needs 
constant evaluation and renewal. Unless the value of the product is assessed 
and created according to the demands of the market situation there is no 
guarantee that such product would survive for long. Hence, there is a 
consistent demand of production of new knowledge and its faster 
dissemination. In this regard, market systematically directs knowledge through 
brochures, symbols, advertisement for effective communication.  
Thus in the market centered economy, knowledge production is 
influenced by the market. The curriculum of the institutions is structured to 
meet the demand of the market. Since many high standard professionals are 
needed to maintain the process, we only produce intellectuals who would fit 
into the system to provide better service and in return there is huge material 
gain. Knowledge sharing thus becomes largely money oriented and aims at 
material development. In other words, the market and the capital create 
knowledge system and produce the kind of knowledge it requires to maintain 
the growth of economy.   
IV. Knowledge Sharing: the Trade between Private and Public Sphere 
We need to examine the normative intentionality of knowledge sharing 
inclined towards the market economy. Firms and companies do not share their 
knowledge which is unique to them. For instance, documentation, work 
routine, trade secrets, etc. have still remained private (Matusik 2002, 458). 
Sharing the private knowledge among all the members belonging to a 
company is also restricted. Nevertheless, the intentional transfer of data or 
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information within the system requires a formal integration mechanism. This 
indicates a normative relationship within the cross functional teams, 
interdepartmental coordination, etc. Privacy is needed to prevent misuse and 
distortion of data.  
However, company and institutions as primary stock-holders of data 
are often reluctant to share with secondary investigators. They emphasize that 
sharing is a voluntary activity and not an obligation (Stanley & Stanley 1998). 
Sharing as a voluntary action empowers the stake-holder of data by imposing 
certain normative condition on the secondary researchers. Organization as an 
agent acts voluntarily with certain discretionary power that helps them in 
exercising the right to permit or rationalize of the refusal. Moreover, as owners 
of data, organizations are quite imposing of certain standards on secondary 
researchers. A fair sharing must fulfill the desirability conditions laid down by 
the standards for the evaluation of integrity and trust of the secondary 
researcher. The onus is on the secondary researcher that they must live up to 
the normative standard imposed on them. Secondary researchers are often 
treated as less qualified agents for analyzing and interpreting the data. 
Nevertheless, the mode of sharing remains partial (Spencer 2000). Companies 
and corporate always serve their own interests, and do not feel obliged to share 
the data. Hence sharing information or data remains a voluntary act for them.   
Sharing, as an obligation amounts to grant rights and duties to the 
agency as the custodian or trustee of knowledge. Sharing is a collective 
enterprise must maintain a normative bond between individuals to realize 
collective goal. Hence, both primary stock-holders and the secondary 
researchers must be accountable for any kind of irregularities and misuse of 
knowledge. Moreover, in some cases sharing is not obligatory action, for 
instance, it is not encouraged within certain field of scientific research and 
strategic security matters. In these fields one cannot be open to an altruistic 
model where every researcher and investigators are entitled to reach out or 
share research data freely. Free sharing and open access to information would 
make it idealistic and simple (Stanley & Stanley 1998, 175). However, in the 
other cases, like developmental research, the growth of knowledge depends on 
data sharing; hence it is warranted that there should be ‘balance between data 
sharing and the development of the original data sets.’ (Stanley & Stanley 1998, 
197). 
Moreover, the development of private knowledge and its efficiency are 
benefited profoundly by the availability of public knowledge. Firms and 
organizations though maintain privacy they keep themselves engaged with the 
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outer-world through their networks, alliances and local proximity. In the 
public domain knowledge is open and there is no competition and priority 
involved in accessing to public knowledge. Cultural knowledge falls in this 
category of public knowledge. It is also known as tacit knowledge. Knowledge 
articulated in this realm sometimes works more effectively than the knowledge 
articulated in the realm of academics and other institutions. Though the 
process of articulation in the academia is scientific and explicit, still no 
guarantee is there that it would be efficient to produce desired consequences. 
For instance, some sociologists, social activists and environmentalists failed to 
stop the fishermen of Gujarat cost from hunting the whales. But this violent act 
of the fishermen was stopped when Murari Bapu talked to these fishermen 
mentioning that the whales belong to their ancestors. Shiv Visvanathan 
illustrates this idea showing the failure of scientific knowledge and success of 
the knowledge articulated by religious gurus. The gurus of the globalized 
world are effective whereas scientific knowledge is ineffective sometimes. 
These gurus communicate the ideas in the language of occult which 
Visvanathan calls occult sociology (Visvanthan 2006).  
At the outer-world cultural knowledge is mostly available in tacit form. 
The tacit knowledge is considered implicit in its nature; still it requires rational 
articulation and deserves mass communication for the benefit of the humanity. 
For instance, Buddha, Gandhi, Baba Ramdev, all have contributed significantly 
to different aspects of culture such as social ethics for harmony and peace, non-
violence as means for political reformation and yoga as health care system, 
respectively. The knowledge is shared without any intention to make profit. 
However, sharing the cultural knowledge is personal and deeply rooted in 
individual’s feeling and experience. The individual develops his 
understanding, personal beliefs and insights reflecting on the tradition and the 
content of cultural knowledge.  
V. Knowledge Sharing as an Obligatory Action: Locating its Ontology  
All knowledge, economical, scientific, medical, political, etc., are grounded in 
certain norms for generating right kind of knowledge. For instance, in the case 
of market economy, it is not just making ample profits but market also intends 
to process the profit to all sectors of society. There are normative 
presuppositions through which it tries to realize its end. As Werkmeister (1967)  
emphasizes,  
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A market economy is possible in the long run only if honesty, self-discipline, 
justice, respect for human dignity, public spirit, and similar virtue prevail. These 
virtues are not product of the market – of supply or demand and of free 
competition; they are, rather, presuppositions, their moral framework, and rooted 
in social commitments which transcend the market as such. It is not the market that 
creates our values. It is our valuation that creates market and sustains the market. 
(cf., 218-219).  
Market functions on the background of certain moral forces. These moral forces 
are intentionally structured to restore certain basic human values. Unless we 
show the minimum commitment and societal concern for the other, market 
economy cannot sustain and produce the growth of economy. The very 
concern for such practice of economy is significantly drawn upon a normative 
framework of knowledge sharing.  
 Knowledge sharing as an obligatory action involves the knower and the 
learner in that normative framework in which they share a common intention 
(Bratman 1999, 95) upholding mutual reciprocity and cooperation. That makes 
sharing a collective enterprise for knowing. In the case of natural science and 
social science, research is a collectively performed. A few student-researchers 
who pursue their work under someone’s supervision are the learners, whereas 
the supervisors themselves are called primary researchers. Unless the primary 
researcher shows any obligation for the secondary researchers, knowledge 
sharing will be vulnerable. Hence, it is obligatory that owner of the knowledge 
must care for the other and treat the sharer as an end but not as a means (Kant 
1964, 101). If the former uses the latter as means to gain power there is no loss 
of moral dignity. Knowledge as power has the potency for intentional 
misutilization, whereas knowledge as virtue creates harmony (Chattopadhyaya 
1991). Knowledge as virtue makes a person competent at the same time 
morally committed to learn from the other. Thus the knower not only restores 
the dignity of the learner, but also gives an opportunity to the learner to 
exercise his moral rights – right to knowledge.  
Caring as a normative value signifies the intellectual virtue of the 
knower. The knower must have the intellectual ability of relating as well as 
distancing oneself from the things that we must care for. Showing the 
significance of this virtue – care-knowing, Dalmiya (2002) writes,  
The root notion of caring for a person generates an epistemic vigilance not only 
about the direct object of care but also the nature of motivation of the caring." (cf., 
35).  
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 One must self examine the motivation of initiating an action as well as pursing 
it. Caring is not one-sided activity, rather it requires mutual reciprocity. And 
hence care-reception is essential feature of sharing. This according to Dalmiya 
(2002) creates “an avenue to register the wishes, and even possible disapproval, 
of the cared for. It thereby makes the cared for an active participant in 
sustaining caring.” (cf., 38). Caring needs to be sustained for making the 
participants morally committed and responsible. The attitude of mentoring 
performed by the primary researcher is significant in this regard. His 
involvement in the entire process of investigation and learning shows his 
moral concern towards his fellow researcher or students. Here, ‘caring begins 
in an ethical moment’ of a researcher’s academic life initiating a moral 
commitment and at the same time cultivating ‘critical engagement with the 
commitment’ that gives birth to epistemic responsibility. In other words, 
knowledge development as an epistemic responsibility should be integrated 
with moral responsibility (Dalmiya, cf., 49). Knowledge sharing needs both of 
them in order to show that caring is an integral part of all kinds of epistemic 
enterprises. The virtue of the enterprise lies in developing trust and good will 
which helps in maintaining reliability and responsibility in the field of sharing.  
Furthermore, caring does indicate the act of valuing. Explaining the 
difference between value and valuing, Audi (2007) points out that value 
signifies something worthy, valuing signifies caring.  He writes,  
mixing these up is abetted by how commonly we care about is intrinsically valuable 
and hence has non-instrumental worth – value even apart from any good effects. 
Valuing the valuable is fitting; but, as vanity and hunger for power show, people 
sometimes care about things that are neither good in themselves nor lead to 
anything that is. Valuing is not always directed toward the valuable (cf., 36-38).  
Hence the intention of valuing and caring evaluated because knowledge 
developed, accumulated and used for gaining power and material prosperity 
may remain guided by the psychological satisfaction and economic gain. It is 
obvious that market-economy would generate this kind of reality which is 
apparently motivated for making profits. And that may invite any kind of reason 
for justifying the rights of knowledge sharing. To put any kind of reason for 
justifying the profit motives and making an action effective is not normative at 
all. Rather, in the realm of knowledge economy sharing knowledge as 
normative act should be grounded in good reason (Dancy 2000). It is because 
‘good is beyond the satisfaction of personal desire’ (Dalmiya 2002, 42-43) and 
hence mere rational justification for an action needs to be examined for the 
development of knowledge. If the ‘motivating intention of action is not good 
66 | Ranjan K. Panda 
 
 
then it is not be considered as a reason at all.’ (Dancy 2000, 3). The construal of 
the content of motivation, thus, ought to be guided by reason. Kant emphasizes 
pure practical reason (Kant 2008, 31-32) for the moral consideration of the will. 
The will as faculty to choose ought to be motivated by reason.  It is a practical 
necessity that we act with the good will for the sake of knowledge. Knowledge 
sharing would be successful if the act is performed with obligation and duty. 
Action in this mode transcends the personal feeling and desire.   
The performance of action is important, because mere good will for 
caring is not completely free from doubts. Hence, Pradhan (2001)  stresses that 
the recent metaphysics of value should be grounded and exhibited in action. 
He writes,  
Actions are repository of human wishes, desires, motives and intentions. In action 
alone the whole man is revealed. This is the reason why for understanding the man 
we have to looking into his behaviour, his character, and above all his inner will 
(cf., 644-675).  
Unless actions are connected with the will, motive and intention of the agent 
valuing cannot be successfully done. There is a need to develop a 
comprehensive point of view which would help in judging the person’s action 
as well as the personality. In the pursuit of epistemic activities the integration 
between action and agent is important for the development of knowledge.  
Knowledge sharing as collective activity must be intended together. 
This togetherness creates an independent locus by virtue of the moral concern 
human intentionality. It creates a higher marker – status function by showing the 
attitude of belongingness and cooperation. For Searle, 
The capacity for social cooperation is biologically based capacity shared by human 
and many other species. It is a capacity of collective intentionality is just the 
phenomenon of shared form of intentionality in human … exists both in the form of 
cooperative behaviour and consciously shared attitudes such as shared desires, 
beliefs, and intentions. Collective intentionality is all that is necessary for the 
creation of simple form of social reality and social facts (Searle 2007, 84-85).  
Collective intentionality shows how every individual shares and participates in 
collective action. Every person integrates themselves with the other – is an 
involvement doing something good is a cause in itself to be shared with love 
shows that social dimension of caring (Searle, 2007, p. 37).  This involvement is 
an indicator of self-less motivation and concern for others as well as for the 
sake of caring knowledge per se. And this can form a reality – reality 
constituted by social or collective intentionality. The form of this intentionality 
is such that it could be independently located – out ‘there’ (Searle 2007, 87 & 
Bratman 1999, 123) and collectively shared. Collective intentionality is not an 
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entity is someone’s mind; rather it is an act of working collectively for a 
common goal and intending to create institutional facts. Institutional facts are 
independent of brute facts and the subjective attitudes of the agents. Though 
institutional facts are created by individual intentionality it cannot be reduced 
to a particular intention of an agent. Rather, collective intentionality gives birth 
a status function of the institution – deontic power to regulate individual 
behaviors. Thus, many of our social institutions, money, marriage, political 
power, etc., are formed on this collective intentionality – we intentionality 
(Searle 1995). It provides an ontological foundation of social reality on which the 
intentional attitude of mutual reciprocity, commitment and responsibility are 
based.   
VI. Conclusion 
To conclude, the intentionality of knowledge sharing as an obligatory action 
unifies rationality with normativity for making knowledge and sharing 
knowledge as intrinsically valuable. Knowledge creation and dissemination is 
social responsibility. Though knowledge creation has a subjective root, but in 
the process of articulation it transcends its subjectivity and enters into the 
realm of the social. In this realm, knowledge is shared, validated, objectified, 
practiced, and preserved. All these can be accomplished by giving primacy to 
the normativity of knowledge sharing. Organizations and institutions not only 
producing knowledge but also working for patents, copy rights and intellectual 
rights for the regulation of knowledge in the national and international levels. 
Knowledge construed in such normative framework should aim at achieving 
harmony by involving mutual reciprocity, commitment, and responsibility. On 
the other hand, knowledge sharing as voluntary action generates fear of 
reducing the normative condition of sharing to the personal level thereby has 
scope for asserting its personal ontology. This may also create an apprehension 
of breaching the harmony that is necessary for the proliferation of knowledge. 
And thus, further it may act as denial of the moral right to knowledge. The 
assertion of right to knowledge should involve the good will and obligation to 
share it with others. That latter becomes a primary concern for the knower 
because they put a normative demand on him. That is to say, that insists on 
caring about the caring the knowledge. Thus, the normativity of knowledge 
sharing goes beyond the psychological and the economical desire by 
integrating the moral commitment and responsibility into the very process of 
acquiring knowledge and establishing its relationship with social ontology.  
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Abstract. In the contemporary socio-economical scenario, knowledge sharing has become a 
crucial topic for discussion. As the economy of the societies becoming knowledge centric, 
knowledge production and dissemination by the educational and other social institutions 
must play an important role. In this paper, we discuss the notion of knowledge sharing as 
normative action involving two modes of function: voluntary and obligatory.  Knowledge 
sharing as voluntary action presupposes personal ontology of knowledge. The knower as 
owner of knowledge has the right to disseminate knowledge. The reason of this 
dissemination could be sometimes to fulfill certain psychological desire or material needs, 
rather than purely value centric. Such a mode of sharing could be the reason for the 
degeneration of knowledge. It is because voluntary dissemination of knowledge does not go 
beyond the whims and fancies of the knower. On the other hand, knowledge sharing as an 
obligatory action emphasizes care and commitment. These normative elements could not 
only transform the attitude of the knower, but also help him to transcend the mere economic 
and psychological reasons of knowledge sharing. This transcendental logic of sharing would 
show how knowledge obtains its social ontology. 
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